Broadly speaking, the FLA introduced a so‑called “excluded property” regime in place of the “family purpose” regime found in the FRA. As described by Madam Justice Newbury in V.J.F. v. S.K.W. a.k.a. S.K.F, 2016 BCCA 186 (CanLII):
 … The basic principle intended to be applied to the property of spouses on separation is that they “keep what is theirs”. Most notably, with respect to property acquired by a spouse before the marriage, only the increase in value that accrues during the spouses’ cohabitation is (presumptively) divisible under the Act. The rest is “excluded property” that is presumptively not divisible.
 The interpretation of the definition of “excluded property” is not, with one small exception, in issue in this appeal as Kildonan and the shares in 540 (as well as the proceeds of the sale of the strata units) are undoubtedly family property.
 The value of family property is divided equally unless it is significantly unfair to do so.
 It is useful to recognize that the purpose of the legislative reform to the FRA seems to have been to simplify the division of family property, to render it more certain and predictable, and to divide property on a basis that better fits people’s expectations of fairness. The Legislature attempted to accomplish this purpose in two ways. First, the definition of excluded property in the FLA provides greater clarity regarding what property is subject to division than existed under the FRA, where the identification of family assets was often difficult. Second, the Legislature reduced the discretion of courts to depart from equal division. This was accomplished in part by imposing a higher test for such a departure. Under the new scheme, family property is to be divided equally unless it is “significantly unfair” rather than just “unfair” to do so. A court’s discretion was also limited by identifying more precisely the considerations relevant to the analysis than had previously been the case.
 These policy objectives are clear enough from a comparison of the FLA to the legislation it replaced, the FRA. To the extent that it is helpful, the policy objectives are also clear from extrinsic sources including the Ministry of Attorney General’s White Paper on Family Relations Act Reform: Proposals for a new Family Law Act, (2010), online: <http://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/about-bc-justice-system/legislation-policy/fla/family-law-white-paper.pdf> and legislative debates. These sources reflect the intention to limit and control judicial discretion in reapportioning property and to foster certainty and predictability in property division. At the same time neither the legislation nor the extrinsic sources disclose an intention to eliminate judicial discretion to reapportion family property entirely. For relevant legislative history see: British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 39th Parl., 4th Sess., Vol. 28, No. 2 (17 November 2011) at 8845 (Hon. S. Bond) and British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 39th Parl., 4th Sess., Vol. 28, No. 8 (23 November 2011) at 9036 (Hon. S. Bond).
 It is safe, therefore, to conclude that the Legislature intended to limit the circumstances in which a departure from equal division of family property could be justified because of unequal contributions to its acquisition, preservation, maintenance or improvement. The FLAstarts with the presumption found in s. 81 that family property is to be equally divided. As I read s. 81, each spouse is presumptively entitled to an undivided half interest in all family property, regardless of their respective use or contribution. I do not think the use of the words “regardless of their respective use or contribution” in s. 81(a), rather than in s. 81(b), is inconsistent with that view. Any potential uncertainty on this point would have been removed if s. 81(b) had read “on separation, each spouse has a right to an undivided half interest in all family property, regardless of their respective use or contribution”. But as I read it, the phrase in s. 81(a) refers to the basis of entitlement to family property. Entitlement exists independent of contribution or use, and the extent of that entitlement on separation is defined in s. 81(b).
 Also, because family property is generally valued on the date of the hearing, the parties will presumptively share in any post-separation increases in the value of family property. Once again, because of s. 81, this entitlement exists independent of the parties’ respective contribution to the post-separation increase in value.
 Nonetheless, the scheme contemplates judicial discretion to depart from an equal division. That discretion is recognized in s. 81 and further articulated in s. 95. Section 95 defines both the test and the factors for a court to consider in exercising its discretion.
 Clearly, the statutory intent is to constrain the exercise of judicial discretion. The test of “significant unfairness” imposes a more stringent threshold than the mere “unfairness” test of the FRA to allow unequal division by a court. As Mr. Justice Butler observed in Remmem v. Remmem, 2014 BCSC 1552 (CanLII), “significant” is defined as “extensive or important enough to merit attention” and the term refers to something that is “weighty, meaningful or compelling.” He concluded that to justify an unequal distribution “[i]t is necessary to find that the unfairness is compelling or meaningful having regard to the factors set out in s. 95(2)”: Remmem at para. 44. As the judge here noted at para. 162 of her reasons, the Legislature intended the general rule of equal division to prevail unless persuasive reasons can be shown for a different result. I agree.
 No doubt the nuanced meaning attaching to the test of “significant unfairness” will develop in the case law. No other province uses the same test, so there is no clear persuasive authority to look to. It would be unwise to attempt to define the test with too much precision in anticipation of circumstances arising in individual cases; however, one can say that reapportionment will require something objectively unjust, unreasonable or unfair in some important or substantial sense.
 The determination of whether an equal division would be significantly unfair is also guided by a more precise identification of relevant factors than was found in the FRA. Importantly, the Legislature did not include in s. 95(2) the principle of relative contribution found in s. 65(1)(f) of the FRA. Under s. 65(1)(f), a court could consider circumstances relating to the acquisition, preservation, maintenance, improvement or use of property. Section 95(2), by comparison, refers rather narrowly to career contributions (95(2)(c)) and to post-separation increases in value beyond market trends caused by one spouse (95(2)(f)). I agree with the judge’s view that if relative contribution to the acquisition, preservation, maintenance or improvement of family property during the relationship was intended to be a significant factor or one frequently relied on in justifying the conclusion that the equal division of family property is significantly unfair, the Legislature would have said so. Allowing relative contribution to become a regular consideration in the context of s. 95 would likely create uncertainty and complexity. This would be contrary to the legislative objectives discussed earlier that underlie the FLA division of property regime.
 Having said that, in enacting s. 95(2)(i) the Legislature recognized that there may be factors other than those listed that could ground significant unfairness. Hence, while the Legislature intended to limit and constrain the exercise of judicial discretion to depart from equal division, it did not provide a closed list of factors and it did not eliminate the discretion. Accordingly, in my view, one cannot read the FLA as abolishing unequal contribution as a factor that may be relevant to reapportionment, although the circumstances in which it may be considered and relied on are intended to be much constrained.